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Abstract 
 The stock market shocks of 2020 caused by the COVID-19 crisis have been met 
by monetary policy announcements rapidly issued by the central banks of developed 
economies, signaling a concerted effort to keep markets afloat. Utilizing an ordinary least 
squares regression, this paper tests whether the monetary policy announcements of the 
central banks of the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom served their 
intended purpose in soothing market reactions via high-frequency event data. For the 
overall stock market, I find that the Federal Reserve’s announcements boosted market 
returns of the S&P 500 Index by 4.2%, the All Ordinaries Index by 1.3%, and the FTSE 
Index by 5.3%. When analyzing each sector, the broad consensus across each country 
was a jump in response to the Fed’s announcements. However, Australia and the UK 
experienced adverse market reactions to their own domestic central bank policy 
announcements. Finally, the US regional banks and US regional bank ETFs met the Fed’s 
announcements with substantial enthusiasm, but evinced concerns that the Fed’s 
expansion of its balance sheet could be a catalyst for inflation. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the Federal Reserve drove the market recovery both domestically and 
abroad in the latter half of the 2020 with the launch of its novel credit programs. 
Unprecedented monetary base expansions may soften the blow for the overall stock 
market, but may pose a looming inflationary threat. 
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News of the novel coronavirus was the catalyst for a 33.7% drop in the S&P 500 
stock market index between February 19th and March 23rd of 2020.1 In response, the 
Federal Reserve announced an expansion of its U.S. dollar liquidity swap lines to 
creditworthy central banks on March 19th, 2020. To the central banks of Australia, Brazil, 
Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland, the Fed extended up to $60 billion 
each of liquidity swap lines. Additionally, the Fed extended up to $30 billion each to 
central banks of Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand.2 In April, the Federal Reserve lent 
an additional half a trillion dollars to overseas investors, which represented a substantial 
portion of the emergency lending the central bank extended to combat the coronavirus.3 
The Federal Reserve has instituted a massive expansion of monetary policy beyond its 
normal bounds, and other central banks have undertaken similar – albeit, smaller – 
expansions during a period of economic uncertainty. For instance, the Bank of England 
cut interest rates by 65 basis points to 0.1 percent, increased its holdings of government 
bonds by 200 billion pounds sterling, and even made 330 billion pounds of loans and 
guarantees available for businesses.4 On the other hand, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
slashed interest rates by 25 basis points twice in the month of March alone, resulting in a 
                                                
1 Cox, Josue, Daniel L. Greenwald, and Sydney C. Ludvigson (2020). “What Explains the COVID-19 
Stock Market?” Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
2 Federal Reserve Board of Governors. (2020, March 19). Federal Reserve announces the establishment of 
2 Federal Reserve Board of Governors. (2020, March 19). Federal Reserve announces the establishment of 
temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements with other central banks. [Press Release] 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200319b.htm. 
3  Ng, Serena and Timiraos, Nick (2020). “Covid Supercharges Federal Reserve as Backup Lender to the 
World,” Wall Street Journal, August 3. https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-federal-reserve-jerome-powell-
covid-coronavirus-dollar-lending-economy-foreign-currency-
11596228151?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2. 




0.25 percent interest rate.5 Therefore, it is worthwhile to compare the United States 
central bank’s monetary policy response to the coronavirus to overseas central banks 
where sufficiently high frequency data are available.  
The narrative behind the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented expansion as the global 
lender of last resort is that financial markets were revived by the announcement of the 
plethora of liquidity programs from the central bank following a complete economic 
shutdown in mid-March (Hetzel, 2020). Even though the facilities employed by the Fed 
were not even operational, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell attributes this to the 
easing of the market. In fact, Powell noted that “even before [the Federal Reserve] began 
lending, [markets] started to work again. There’s a confidence factor” (Hetzel pg. 6, 2020 
). Granted, the market swiftly recovered between March 24th and April 17th of 2020, 
recouping 29% of its lost value in that period.6 Nevertheless, this claim warrants a 
comparative empirical analysis to be fully validated. One study finds that the Federal 
Reserve’s announcement effects are strongest for its liquidity programs (Barr, Jackson, 
and Tahyar 2020). This may be true when the Federal Reserve utilizes its traditional 
policy tools, but the United States has taken unprecedented actions into private credit 
markets, as well as foreign markets. In fact, the Fed’s “unconventional” monetary policy 
announcements of these actions have resulted in gains of approximately 8% in the S&P 
500 stock market index (Cox et. al, 2020). 
Yet, there remains a significant gap in the literature: the effects of the Federal 
Reserve’s novel credit programs – examples of which include the Main Street Lending 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Cox, Josue, Daniel L. Greenwald, and Sydney C. Ludvigson (2020). “What Explains the COVID-19 




Program (MSLP) and the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) – have yet to be assessed 
on easing market conditions in developed economies overseas. I attempt to address these 
shortcomings in the literature by exploring the impact of the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy announcements on US stock market returns (S&P 500), as well the stock market 
returns of two select countries: Australia and the United Kingdom. The reason for 
selection of these countries is based on availability of high-frequency monetary data as 
well as for global representation purposes: one country in North America, one country in 
Europe, and one isolated island country. Further, I illustrate each country’s own domestic 
monetary policy responses to the coronavirus pandemic, and analyze whether the Federal 
Reserve’s actions or the home central bank’s actions rendered favorable market outlooks. 
The broadening of the Federal Reserve’s programs had substantial effects on the 
corporate bond market (Haddad et. al, 2020), but the reaction of foreign economies to 
these programs has yet to be assessed. Specifically, I use data from three separate 
sources: central bank websites, Ourworldindata.org, and Bloomberg. I take into account 
stock markets effects of monetary policy by considering not only the overall rates of 
money emission but also dummy variables that capture announcement effects of the 
major policy initiatives launched by the Federal Reserve and the other central banks.  
Considering the recent monetary explosion requires a historical comparison to the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Federal Reserve’s monetary base increase of $1,390 
billion between February and April 2020 was larger in scale when compared to the 
aggregate total monetary base in the final days of October 2008.7 The monetary base 
continued to expand into May and May 2020, and peaked in the final days of May. At 
                                                
7 Burdekin, Richard C.K. (2020). “The U.S. Money Explosion of 2020, Monetarism and Inflation: Plagued 
by History?” forthcoming in Modern Economy. 
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this point and into the first week of June 2020, the U.S. monetary base reached a height 
of $5,199 billion (see Figure 1). At the same time, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
increased its open market operations to maintain confidence in the Australian financial 
market. To respond to the banking system’s upsurge in demand for liquidity, the 
operations were expanded in both size and maturity. On March 19th, 2020, the RBA’s 
open market operations peaked at $12,696 Australian dollars, coinciding with the worst 
day in the Australian stock market (see Figure 2). Lastly, the U.K. economy plunged by 
20.4% in the second quarter. Government-ordered lockdowns halted economic activity, 
with the U.K. stock market falling to 5,080.58 Great British Pounds on March 18th, 2020 
(see Figure 3). The Bank of England countered with quantitative easing to increase bond 
purchases, resulting in an expansion of the bank’s asset purchase program to 745 billion 
Great British Pounds – over triple the amount of bonds purchased during the Global 
Financial Crisis.8  
The monetary series are combined with data on virus cases and deaths. Then, I 
determine stationarity within my variables utilizing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for 
stationarity, and found growth in virus cases and growth in deaths to be preferable to 
cases per capita and deaths per capita on stationarity grounds. I use an ordinary least 
squares approach to determine the relative impacts of monetary policy announcements, 
rate of monetary emission, and progression of the pandemic as measured in virus cases 
and virus-related deaths. Several specifications are presented, including switching the 
virus term to determine if one virus variable was capturing a more representative picture 
                                                
8 Chan, Szu Ping (2020). “Coronavirus: Bank pumps £100bn into UK economy to aid recovery.” BBC 




of the economic landscape within each country. I find that the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy announcement caused a 4.2% increase in the S&P 500 when the virus 
term was limited to the percentage increase in COVID-19 cases. Unfortunately, neither 
Australia’s monetary policy announcement nor the United States’ alleviated financial 
market concerns in Australia. Finally, I illustrate that the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy announcements boosted consumer confidence in the United Kingdom – for every 
announcement made, the FTSE 100 Index rose by 5.3%. Therefore, the United Kingdom 
was responsive to the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented willingness to lend to foreign 
entities. During a period where the United Kingdom is currently transitioning out of the 
European Union via the withdrawal agreement, United States dollars are perceived as the 
penultimate safe asset for United Kingdom investors. 
Furthermore, I seek to examine the impacts of the central banks’ monetary policy 
announcements on each major market sector within the United States, Australia, and 
United Kingdom. The intention behind this approach is to highlight the impacts of the 
policy announcements on each sector. I also conduct additional analysis focusing on the 
overall implications for the banking sector. I found that many United States sector indices 
responded positively to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements, 
suggesting that such programs increased confidence across a variety of sectors (Energy, 
Communication Services, Financials, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Discretionary). 
Yet, the results from the Australian sector indices are quite mixed. In fact, while most 
sectors responded positively to the Federal Reserve’s policy announcements (Materials, 
Industrials, Financials), one sector in particular responded negatively (Health Care). 
Furthermore, Australia had two sectors which responded negatively to the Reserve bank 
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of Australia’s stimulus announcements (Financials and Real Estate). Finally, the United 
Kingdom sectors experienced volatility from the announcements depending on which 
country they came from. For instance, every sector except one (Information Technology) 
saw a decrease in their respective index from the Bank of England’s announcements. On 
the other hand, six of these ten sectors responded positively to the Federal Reserve’s 
announcements (Energy, Materials, Consumer Discretionary, Financials, Real Estate, 
Communication Services). 
Finally, I take a special look at the affect of the Fed’s policy announcements on 
several regional bank index returns. Then, I also assess the impact of the announcements 
on exchange traded funds composed of United States equities in the regional bank sector. 
In May of 2020, the KBW Regional Banking Index was trading at its largest discount to 
the S&P 500 since 2005.9  Low rates and loan losses have plagued the revenues of 
regional banks. Nevertheless, I am interested in determining how sensitive the lenders are 
to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions to combat the pandemic-induced halting 
of economic activity. As investors held off on bank stocks amidst coronavirus concerns in 
May, whether the banks have rebounded in a way similar to the S&P 500 has yet to be 
deduced. 
The next section provides a literature review of similar studies. Section III 
discusses the data and empirical strategy employed for the paper. Section IV presents the 
ordinary least squares regression results. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                
9 Levitt, Hannah (2020). “Regional Banks Take a Beating with Investors Expecting More Pain.” 




2. Literature Review 
During the Global Financial Crisis, the mere announcement of Federal Reserve 
actions calmed market concerns (Barr, Jackson, and Tahyar 2020). But did this ring true 
for the current COVID-19 crisis? In an effort to quickly alleviate the economic shock of 
the COVID-19 crisis, the Federal Reserve deployed all of the Financial Crisis monetary 
policy tools and programs in its toolkit. It appears the Fed learned from its lagged 
response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Rather than remain on the defensive as it 
did in the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed seems to have opted to take a much more 
proactive approach to support markets in 2020. 
Arguably to combat the fear that short-term funding in the money markets would 
dry up, the Fed added almost one trillion dollars ($978 billion) to bank reserves between 
March 18 and April 1 via its traditional tools. Primarily, the Fed used securities holdings, 
repos, discount window borrowing, and swap lines to achieve this. Edwards, 2020, 
provides a detailed timeline of the monetary policy actions during this period. In 
particular, the Fed instituted three new facilities: the Primary Market Corporate Credit 
Facility, which is intended to provide liquidity for new bond and loan issuances; the 
Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, which is intended to provide liquidity for 
outstanding corporate bonds; and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which 
is intended to support the flow of credit to consumers and businesses (Grund 2020). For 
the first time in the Federal Reserve’s history, assets issued by municipal entities and 
local public authorities were purchased by the central bank.10 
                                                
10 Cavallino, Paolo and De Fiore, Fiorella (2020). “Central Banks’ Response to Covid-19 in Advanced 
Economies.” Bank for International Settlements Bulletin, No. 21. June 5.  
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The Federal Reserve’s “announcement effect” of its programs solidifies its 
credibility in the market as the backup lender of the world. Although the announcement 
effect is the strongest for the Fed’s liquidity programs like the Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), it may not always be sufficient enough to calm market 
conditions. The announcement of the Fed’s novel credit programs, and their effects on 
the S&P 500, has recently been examined in a study by Cox et. al, 2020. In particular, 
they classify the Federal Reserve’s newly established credit facilities during the COVID-
19 crisis as “unconventional” monetary policy announcements, and focus specifically on 
the 30-minute windows surrounding them. Taken together, they attribute the five 
unconventional announcements to pushing the S&P 500 stock market index up 8.3% 
(Cox et. al, 2020). Next, they examine the actual extension of credit that the Federal 
Reserve pledged to supply, and found that there was a rather large difference between 
this number and the dollar amounts on the Fed’s balance sheet. Collectively, the 
announcement of the Federal Reserve’s credit programs that were entirely new to the 
COVID-19 crisis contributed to the market rebound. Yet, as argued by Cox et. al, 2020, 
improving investor’s willingness to bear market risk was driven by sentiment as opposed 
to substantive credit issued by the central bank. 
Relatedly, Haddad et. al (2020) examine the Federal Reserve’s large-scale 
interventions in debt markets from March to April of 2020 using high frequency event 
studies and show how these interventions affected debt markets. Upon the Federal 
Reserve’s March 23rd announcement to purchase investment-grade bonds, they find that 
investment-grade bond prices increased by 7% with essentially no effects on other asset 
prices (Haddad et. al, 2020). However, these effects are more pronounced in the safer end 
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of the investment-grade spectrum – those bonds with lower maturities and lower credit 
risk. They also find that the April 9th announcement effectively raised the price of both 
investment-grade and high-yield bonds, while having a more sweeping effect on other 
asset prices at the same time. Because the April 9th policy move expanded bond 
purchases, and even broadened the scope of the policy to include “fallen angel” bonds 
(i.e., bonds that have been reduced to junk status because their issuers have fallen into 
financial trouble), it arguably had a much stronger impact on the debt market. From 
February 1st to April 23rd, the S&P 500 experienced the most substantial decline at 
approximately -35% from peak to trough (Haddad et. al 2020). In the third week of 
March, stocks reached their minimum, and slowly rebounded through April, but the 
cumulative return still remained at about -15%. In an effort to intentionally take on credit 
risk, the Federal Reserve made a series of announcements intended to target short-term 
funding markets. 
The literature on the Reserve Bank of Australia’s response to the COVID-19 
crisis remains limited. However, there is one study that finds that monetary policy 
announcements had caused an increase in volatility in the banking sector in the past – 
specifically, the announcement of a new target cash rate (Atwood and Karpavicius 2018). 
The Reserve Bank of Australia precisely took these actions on March 3rd (when the cash 
rate was lowered to 50 basis points) and subsequently on March 19th (when the cash rate 
was lowered to 25 basis points) to reduce the economic and financial strain from the 
coronavirus. Furthermore, the body of literature on the Bank of England is also scarce. In 
fact, no current literature exists examining the impact of COVID, or related public health 
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crises, on the FTSE market returns. However, it is worth considering the impact of the 
March 11th announcements on the United Kingdom stock returns. 
Crucial financial market segments were stymied by liquidity worries of 
households and corporations. Yet, central banks in advanced economies took necessary 
actions swiftly and forcefully to perpetuate smooth market functioning – drawing from 
the experience of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Traditionally, central banks take on 
roles as lenders of last resort for the financial sector in their respective economies in 
periods of economic uncertainty, but the current crisis has pushed several central banks 
beyond this role. In fact, the central banks of advanced economies like the United States 
and the United Kingdom have also provided liquidity to private non-financial sectors to 
ease the flow of credit to firms and households (Cavallino and De Fiore, 2020). For 
example, both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England chartered targeted lending 
programs in addition to cutting interest rates. These programs were intended to supply 
ample funds to banks at favorable terms contingent on the extension of loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The Federal Reserve’s Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) 
authorized four-year loans to firms who, prior to the pandemic, were in good financial 
standing. Therefore, this program intentionally provided liquidity to small and medium 
enterprises. On October 30th, the Federal Reserve decreased the minimum loan 
requirement of the MSLP to $100,000 to incentivize further participation of smaller 
businesses in the program. More recently, the Bank of England opted to keep interest 
rates where they are, but accelerated its bond-buying more than had previously been 
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expected.11 The Bank of England’s primary concern is to sidestep economic fallout from 
the coronavirus amidst a grueling Brexit process that will potentially be resolved within 
weeks. 
The original intentions of the Fed’s monetary policy actions and an alphabet soup 
of programs were arguably to restore confidence in the financial system and calm market 
volatility (Barr, Jackson, and Tahyar 2020). Several papers have focused specifically on 
liquidity in the recent COVID-19 crisis (Kargar et al 2020; Fleming et. al 2020; Schrimpf 
et. al 2020), and assess whether the Fed’s actions have supplied ample liquidity to the 
financial system through these programs. In fact, there are significant differences 
between the United States’ emergency powers to provide liquidity to the financial system 
and Europe’s. While the United States is reluctant to inhibit its central bank’s role as 
global lender of last resort, the European currency union is unable to reach a consensus 
for the resolution of notable credit institutions (Grund, 2020). Due to the small window of 
opportunity for national solutions in Europe, as well as the European Central Bank’s lack 
of authority in providing liquidity in resolution, the Federal Reserve has expanded its role 
during the current crisis. 
In my paper, I determine if a rebound in the S&P 500 can be traced back to the 
announcements of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions. This is an addition 
because while one study found that the monetary policy announcements increased 
investment-grade bond prices (Haddad et. al, 2020), it overlooked whether these 
announcements affected the overall stock market. I also seek to provide an empirical 
                                                
11 Golden, Theo (2020). “Pound Rallies After Bank of England Pumps Extra Cash into the Economy, Just 





basis of explanation between the central bank responses of three select nations: the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Another reason these countries were 
selected is they are amongst the very few countries that release high-frequency monetary 
policy data on their respective central bank websites (i.e., weekly monetary base for the 
United States and United Kingdom, and daily open market operations for Australia). 
Utilizing higher-frequency data as opposed to an annual series employed by Barro, Usua, 
and Weng (2020) can provide a more detailed examination of immediate market 
responses to pandemic events (Burdekin, 2020). Because of the rapidly changing 
economic perceptions of the coronavirus, higher-frequency stock market data is required 
to track the varying market returns of each country.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
My analysis includes data from the United States, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom.  I discuss each in turn. As no single data source includes all of the variables of 
interest, using three different sources is a prerequisite for my analysis. The first data 
source is the weekly monetary base from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s website. This 
data set provides information on the weekly total balances maintained by the Federal 
Reserve, plus the currency in circulation. Although the data set was recently 
discontinued, the sample collected for the United States includes 39 observations, 
beginning on December 18th, 2019 and running until September 9th, 2020. For the 
Australian sample, the first data source is from the Reserve Bank of Australia’s website, 
which supplied data on the daily open market operations of the central bank. The 
Australian data range from December 31st, 2019  to August 31st, 2020, and includes 170 
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observations. Thus, the Australian sample is likely to provide the most accurate 
representation given it includes the highest-frequency central bank data. Finally, the 
sample for the United Kingdom utilizes the same three data sources.  For the United 
Kingdom, the Bank of England’s weekly monetary policy announcements were recorded 
from its website, which released weekly amounts outstanding of total sterling notes and 
coins in circulation. The first date assessed is December 18th, 2019. However, this data 
set was discontinued on August 26th, 2020, so there remain limitations with regards to 
the number of observations available (n=37). 
The second dataset I use for all three countries is the last price of the respective 
stock market indices collected from Bloomberg, which serves as a snapshot to investor 
outlook as the economic problems stemming from the coronavirus progressed. The 
United States’ market returns were examined via the S&P 500, documented weekly on 
each day of the reported monetary base by the Federal Reserve. The dates of the 
monetary base coincide with the respective dates of the stock returns on the Wednesday 
of each week. Bloomberg also includes daily stock market returns from the All 
Ordinaries Index, the major index representing the Australian market. As with the United 
States sample, the dates of the open market operations are matched with the dates of the 
All Ordinaries stock returns. Furthermore, data from the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE) 100 Index is also compiled from Bloomberg. 
Finally, I collect information on four coronavirus variables from 
Ourworldindata.org, a scientific online publication that focuses on COVID-19 data. 
These data allow me to account for COVID-19 cases and COVID-19 deaths. The same 
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source is utilized for all three countries observed: the United States, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom.  
In order to test for stationarity of the variables in question, the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test is employed for each country. The technique tests for unit roots within my data 
set. This is especially vital due to the varying characteristics within time series data, and 
is required to determine how many first differences are required to make the series 
stationary. When stationarity is found among a time series, it can subsequently provide an 
accurate model. For the United States, percentage changes in the S&P 500 Returns, U.S. 
Monetary Base, increases in COVID-19 cases, and increases in COVID-19 deaths all 
exhibit as stationary from this test (see Table 4). The same variables are tested in the UK 
sample, and all variables are also determined to be stationary (see Table 6). Even with the 
larger sample size prevalent in the Australia sample, all variables are found to be 
stationary from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (see Table 5). To assess the potential 
stock-market effects of the rise in COVID-19 cases and deaths within the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the week-on-week increase is calculated utilizing the weekly 
data on civilian cases and deaths. However, for the Australian sample, the day-on-day 
increase in COVID-19 cases and deaths is calculated given the higher frequency of the 
Australian open market operations. 
For the United States, my key dependent variable is the weekly first difference of 
the S&P 500 returns. This was calculated by taking the percentage change in the weekly 
S&P 500 returns [(current weekly returns – prior weekly returns)/prior weekly returns], 
and subtracting the percentage change of the returns from the prior week. Beginning with 
December 25th, 2020 until September 9th, 2020 the first difference in the S&P 500 
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returns ranged from a loss of -12.52% to a gain of 11.31% (See Table 1).  For Australia, 
my key independent variable is the first difference of the daily percentage change in the 
All Ordinaries Index. The daily percentage change ranges from a drop of -13.6% to a 
gain of 15% (See Table 2A). The United Kingdom’s dependent variable is defined as the 
first difference of the percentage change in the FTSE Index on a week-to-week basis. The 
lower bound of the weekly percentage change in the FTSE is -16%, while the upper 
bound is 25.5% (See Table 3A). The primary reason for first differencing the dependent 
variables was to avoid non-stationarity. Without first differencing, the lagged dependent 
variables exhibited coefficients close to one. Therefore, it was necessary to calculate the 
differenced growth rates of each country’s market indices for my estimation approach. 
Prior to analysis, correlation matrices between the first differenced variables were 
computed for each country to identify statistically significant relationships among 
variables. After taking the first difference in the S&P 500 Returns, the change in the US 
monetary base was negatively correlated with the First Difference market returns (-.364) 
(see Table 1C; Columns 1 and 2, Row 3). Furthermore, the change in US COVID-19 
cases was negatively correlated (-.372) with the monetary expansion (see Table 1C; 
Column 3, Row 4). Likely, cases decreased consistently as government-mandated 
shutdowns halted economic activity, and the Fed followed up with an explosion in money 
at the crux of economic uncertainty. Moreover, the change in COVID-19 deaths has a 
negative relationship with the change in monetary base at  -.282 (see Table 1C; Column 
3, Row 5). Finally, the United States central bank’s monetary policy announcements were 
strongly correlated with the change in monetary base – a relationship which should come 
as no surprise. 
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When the Australian variables were first differenced, the percentage change in 
Australian COVID-19 cases was negatively correlated to the All Ordinaries returns (-.362 
(see Table 2C; Columns 1 and 2, Row 4). Therefore, an increase in Australian cases was 
indicative of the market drop in mid-March. The percentage change in COVID-19 deaths 
followed a similar correlation to both the first difference in All Ordinaries returns (-.180), 
but the correlation coefficient was approximately half the coronavirus cases coefficient 
(see Table 2C; Columns 1 and 2, Row 5). Attributable to this discrepancy is the delayed 
spike in Australian deaths (Figure 5). Along the same vein, the percentage change in 
COVID-19 deaths was positively correlated with COVID-19 cases (see Table 2C; 
Column 4, Row 5). The RBA issued monetary policy announcements in the midst of 
surging coronavirus concerns on March 18th,  Whereas the majority of the United States 
announcements came towards the end of March and April 2020, when the All Ordinaries 
Index recovered from the initial shock. It was also found that the Fed’s policy 
announcements had a negative correlation with the RBA’s policy announcements (see 
Table 2C; Column 6, Row 7).  
Once the United Kingdom’s variables were first differenced, the change in the 
U.K. monetary base was positively correlated with the FTSE returns. Thus, this variable 
reflects the overall impact of the bond purchases on the rebound in the FTSE returns (see 
Table 3C; Column 1, Row 3). Interestingly, the Bank of England’s monetary policy 
announcements had a substantial negative relationship with the change in COVID-19 
deaths, as highlighted by a correlation coefficient of -.616 (see Table 3C; Column 5, Row 
6).  This negative relationship is a result of the BOE announcements being made prior to 
the spike in deaths on March 18th of 2020 (see Figure 6). When first differenced, the 
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Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements were positively correlated with the 
United Kingdom’s change in COVID-19 deaths, but were negatively correlated with the 
BOE’s policy announcements – these coefficients were .383 and -.289, respectively (see 
Table 3C; Columns 5 and 6, Row 7). The Fed’s announcements coincided with the abrupt 
increase in the U.K.’s COVID-19 cases, yet occurred much later than the BOE’s policy 
announcements. 
I create an indicator variable for a monetary policy announcement equal to 1 if 
there was an announcement and 0 otherwise. However, the way I determine if there was a 
monetary announcement differs by country. Specifically, I determine if there was a 
monetary announcement in the United Kingdom if a monetary policy announcement was 
made in the same week as the observation on the following Wednesday using information 
gathered from the central bank’s Press Releases via their website.  For the United States, 
I rely on Edwards (2020)  and Cox et. al, 2020, to identify significant monetary policy 
announcements in the month of March made by the United States Federal Reserve. The 
dummies reflected a total of 13 unconventional announcements studied by Cox et. al, 
2020 in the months of March and April of 2020. Then, the announcements were 
combined into 5 weekly dummies to encompass the creation of the Fed’s novel credit 
facilities (see A.1 in Appendix). The mean of these announcements is 0.128 (see Table 
1A). This policy dummy is replicated in the following two samples to assess the impact 
of the Federal Reserve announcements on foreign market confidence. For Australia, I 
searched the Reserve Bank of Australia website to identify the dates when the RBA made 
significant monetary policy announcements. In the Australian sample, the mean of the 
United States announcement goes down to 0.029, which is attributed to the substantial 
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number of observations of 170 (see Table 2A). The Reserve Bank of Australia only had 
two significant monetary policy announcements. The first being on March 3rd, when the 
RBA initially lowered the cash rate, and the second being on March 19th of 2020, which 
included several significant monetary policy announcements in an attempt to support the 
flow of credit to businesses and households (see A.2 in Appendix). As such, the mean of 
the Australian policy announcement dummy variable is 0.012 (see Table 2A). Lastly, the 
United States policy dummy is accounted for in the United Kingdom sample as well. 
Subsequently, the mean of the Fed policy dummy increases to 0.135 (See Table 3A). 
However, the United Kingdom only had one significant monetary policy announcement 
on March 11th, 2020, with the novel Term Funding Scheme announced in addition to the 
continued purchase of corporate and government bonds (see Appendix A.3). The mean of 
the domestic policy announcement dummy within the United Kingdom is only 0.027, 
given the rapid effort of the Monetary Policy Committee to issue the announcements in 
early March (see Table 3A). Due to the infrequency of significant domestic monetary 
policy announcements in Australia and the UK, I suspect that the majority of the 
movement in the All Ordinaries and the FTSE will be credited to the Federal Reserve. 
         Monetary variables are constructed from the central banks data for each country.  
For example, weekly changes in monetary base are calculated by taking the amount at the 
current date, subtracting it from the monetary base amount from the prior date, and then 
dividing that product by the monetary base amount from the prior date. The same 
technique is applied to estimate the weekly changes in coronavirus cases, the weekly 
changes in deaths, the weekly changes in cases per capita, and finally the weekly changes 
in deaths per capita using the data extracted from Ourworldindata.org.. However, after 
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testing for stationarity, I determined that the per capita variables are non-stationary, and 
are thus excluded from the regression model. The percentage change in the United States 
monetary base ranges from a minimum of -4.3% to a high bound of 0% and an upper 
bound of 759% and 642%, respectively (see Table 1A). Australia has significantly lower 
percentage increases in COVID-19 cases and deaths, with their maximums only reaching 
141% and 100%, respectively (see Table 2A). However, with a mean of approximately 
30%, Australia’s open market operations span a wide range covering the dates assessed 
(See Table 2A). Interestingly, the United Kingdom has mean levels of percentage 
changes in cases and deaths larger than either Australia or the United States. This is most 
likely attributed to the United Kingdom’s central location to the epicenter of the 
COVID19 spread throughout the European countries. The percentage change in cases 
varies from 0% to 738%, with a mean of 71% (See Table 3A). On the other hand, the 
percentage change in deaths in the United Kingdom spans from 0% to a shocking 1,071% 
at the upper bound (See Table 3A).  
My data show that the United States experienced the most significant mean 
change in cases 92.5%, while the United Kingdom experienced the most significant mean 
change in deaths at 64.6% (See Tables 1 and 3). In the United States, the change in 
coronavirus cases fluctuated in January and February 2020, but grew substantially in mid 
to late March (see Figure 4). On March 25th 2020, COVID-19 cases increased by 759%, 
with the change in COVID-19 deaths increasing by 642%. At first glance, this might 
indicate that the United States government was hopeless at containing the virus. 
However, the change in coronavirus cases has consistenly declined in April 2020 after 
this peak (see Figure 4). While a potential vaccine would be the most ideal scenario, it 
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appears the government-mandated lockdowns were effective at a national level into the 
third quarter of 2020. On the other hand, Australian measures to combat the coronavirus 
were swift and immediately effective at containing the spread of the novel coronavirus. 
Although the virus arrived in Australia earlier, the change in COVID-19 cases only grew 
as much as 141% on March 23rd, 2020 – the height of the change in Australia (see Figure 
5). In May 2020, the change in COVID-19 cases and deaths were practically nonexistent, 
some of which can be attributed to Australia’s strategic isolated geographic. Yet, this also 
speaks volumes to the strength of the Australian public health care system in mitigating 
the virus. However, the story in the United Kingdom was a much bleaker tone. The 
U.K.’s change in COVID-19 cases unexpectedly jumped from 30% in late February to 
738% in early March 2020 (see Figure 6). Unfortunately, the largest hike in the change in 
COVID-19 deaths followed just two weeks later, with the aforementioned 1,071% 
marking the height of the change on March 18th, 2020 (see Figure 6). Luckily, the United 
Kingdom brought down these frightening death changes in April, and has seen a near-
zero increase in deaths into the third quarter of 2020. The rest of the paper formally 
analyzes the aforementioned descriptive patterns, and identifies if the monetary policy 
announcements had any role in these cross-country differences. 
In addition, I examine whether certain sectors are sensitive to the monetary 
stimulus within each country. Using Australia’s sector classifications as the base model 
(see Tables 12 and 13), I organized both the United States (see Tables 10 and 11) and the 
United Kingdom’s (see Tables 14 and 15) sector indices into the respective groups within 
which they reside. The sectors of interest are: Energy, Communication Services, 
Consumer Discretionary, Health Care, Information Technology, Consumer Staples, 
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Financials, Industrials, Utilities, Real Estate, and Materials (see Tables 10-15). Before my 
regression analysis, I first differenced the sector indices of each country for reasons  
As a final regression technique, I replace the dependent variable in the above with 
weekly data collected on three select US Regional Banking Indices from Bloomberg. 
These indices included the S&P 500 Regional Banks Sub Industry GICS Level 4 Index 
(S5RBNK), the S&P Regional Banks Select Industry Index (SPSIRBK), and the KBW 
Regional Banking Index (KBX). I also sought to include the exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) of US regional bank holdings to ascertain the impact of the Fed’s money supply 
expansion and announcements thereof. Three regional bank ETFs were incorporated into 
my analysis: the SDPR S&P Regional Banking ETF (KRE), iShares US Regional Banks 
ETF (IAT), and the Invesco KBW Regional Banking ETF (KBWR). Similar to the broad 
market indices, the regional banking indices were first differenced to prevent non-
stationarity. 
In order to determine the effect of monetary policy on stock market returns, I 
estimate an ordinary least squares model of the following form by country: 
(1) 𝛥𝑌𝑡𝐶= 𝛼 + 𝐿(𝛥𝑌𝑡𝐶)+ 𝛽∆𝑋𝑡𝐶 + ∆𝛿𝑡
𝐶𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦+ ε𝑡𝐶 
where 𝛥𝑌𝑡𝐶  represents the change in the stock market in period t for country C. For the 
United States, I use the weekly change in the stock market based on the S&P 500; for 
Australia I use the daily change in the stock market based on the Australian stock market 
(All Ordinaries); and for the United Kingdom I use the weekly change in the stock 
market based on the Financial Time Stock Exchange 100 Index. In addition, 𝐿(𝛥𝑌!!) is 
the lagged change in the stock market in period t for country C; ∆𝑋!!  is a vector of the 
change in the monetary base in period t, the change in the weekly COVID-19 cases in 
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period t, the change in the weekly COVID-19 death cases in period t; ∆𝛿!!  is an indicator 
variable of the monetary policy announcements for country C; and ε!!  is an error term 




I. Overall Stock Market Analysis 
Three specifications for each country are estimated in Tables 7-9. The first 
specification includes independent variables as follows: the lagged change in market 
returns, the percentage change in monetary base, the percentage change of increases in 
COVID19 cases, the percentage change of increases in COVID19 deaths, and the change 
in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements, as well as each country’s own 
change in monetary policy announcements. These variables are regressed on the first 
difference of the overall stock market returns of each respective country. For the United 
States, this specification is presented in Panel A of Table 7. It appears that the United 
States’ efforts of injecting money into the financial system via monetary base actions did 
not eliminate investor concerns. For instance, every 10% increase in the monetary base 
results in a 60% decrease in the S&P 500 (See Table 7, Panel A). This does not 
necessarily mean that the United States monetary policy actions were not met with 
enthusiasm by the market when they were enacted, because their positive effects may 
simply have been overwhelmed by the rising panic about the pandemic that was setting in 
at the same time.. Indeed, increases in cases severely hurt investor confidence. Each 10% 
increase in COVID19 cases decreased the S&P 500 returns by 2.1% (See Table 7, Panel 
A). The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements were unable to offset these 
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decreases in market returns. Although the announcement effect is supposedly the 
strongest for the Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs (Haddad et. al, 2020), in the 
current specification, such announcements are not able to sufficiently calm financial 
markets (Barr, Jackson, and Tahyar 2020). Overall, the monetary base actions are 
correlated with significant reductions in the S&P 500, but the effect of U.S. monetary 
policy announcements should be tested for both Australia and the United Kingdom. The 
Federal Reserve’s announcement affect may have bled over to the United Kingdom and 
Australia as the two foreign countries implemented public health measures to combat the 
spread of the coronavirus. 
The first Australian specification encapsulates variables similar to the United 
States pecification described above. The only differences being that the market returns 
are described as the All Ordinaries stock index and percentage changes in monetary base 
is swapped for percentage changes in open market operations. This specification is listed 
in Table 8, Panel A, and includes all variables, as well as the domestic policy 
announcements of the Reserve Bank of Australia. Accordingly, a 10% increase in 
COVID19 cases in Australia resulted in a 3.4% decrease in the All Ordinaries returns 
(Table 8, Panel A). Therefore, Australian investors were influenced by the Australian 
publc health system’s ability to contain the virus. Given that Australia is the most isolated 
of the three countries examined, confidence in financial markets suffered minimally when 
the virus initially spread in the country. Thus, Australians were less optimistic about the 
economic outlook following the arrival of COVID19 into their country. The RBA’s open 
market operations were unable to combat these concerns. Also, for every 10% increase in 
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the lagged change in the All Ordinaries index, the All Ordinaries returns decreased by 
62.2% (Table 8, Panel A).  
The first UK specification is presented in Panel A of Table 9. In the first UK case, 
several variables generate interesting patterns when assessing the impact of the UK’s own 
monetary policy announcement. Surprisingly, the United Kingdom’s decision to launch a 
new Term Funding Scheme on March 11th, and to reduce the bank rate by 50 basis 
points, adversely affects the FTSE market returns. In particular, the announcement is 
associated  with a 13.9% drop in the FTSE returns (Table 9, Panel A). Therefore, 
investors in the United Kingdom appear to be unlikely to see their central bank’s 
willingness to extend credit to small and medium enterprises to be a sufficient response to 
the COVID crisis. Another notable effect is that for every 10% increase in deaths in the 
United Kingdom, the FTSE returns decreases by 2.2% (Table 9, Panel A). Because of 
COVID-19’s rapid spread throughout Europe, the United Kingdom might have been 
more inclined to respond to the increase in the death toll as opposed to the rise in cases.  
The second specification excludes one of the virus terms to determine if 
separating these variables would increase the significance of the Federal Reserve’s policy 
announcements. This might be the case because the market could be more sensitive to 
changes in cases as opposed to changes in deaths, or vice versa. For example, investors 
could be more concerned about the case rate because of its stifling effect on consumer 
spending – the lifeline of the American economy. Removing the percentage change in 
increases in COVID19 deaths is displayed in Table 7, Panel B. This specification renders 
a statistically significant monetary policy announcement on the S&P 500 Returns. In fact, 
every monetary policy announcement by the Federal Reserve is associated with a 4.2% 
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increase in the S&P 500 (Panel B, Table 4). Therefore, it appears that the alphabet soup 
of established Federal Reserve programs helped restore confidence in the United States 
financial system and calmed market volatility. The Federal Reserve’s Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility has already been established to have a strong 
announcement effect (Barr et. al, 2020). But the Main Street Lending Program and the 
Municipal Liquidity Facility generated sufficient response in the stock market to solidify 
its credibility for the foreseeable future. This is consistent with findings of Cox et. al, 
2020, that the S&P 500 rebounded 8.3% in the 30-minute window following the 
announcements of the Fed’s novel facilities. Interestingly, the monetary base negatively 
affects stock market returns even more in this specification, with a 10% increase in the 
monetary base being associated with a 67% drop in the S&P 500 (Panel B, Table 7). In 
addition, a 10%  increase in COVID19 cases is associated with a 1.5% decrease in the 
S&P 500, while a similar increase in lagged market returns corresponds with a 28% fall 
in the S&P 500 (Panel B, Table 7). Casual empiricism suggests that COVID19 deaths 
lack sufficient explanatory power in the initial specification due to the prolonged 
incubation period of the virus, which were likely to not impact trading patterns in the 
short-term. Yet, excluding the variable highlights the positive effect of monetary policy 
announcements on economic concerns. COVID19 deaths are probably not of particular 
concern for the financial market – rather, what was of greater concern was the number of 
cases and the ability of the United States government to contain it. Many United States 
workers are unlikely to resort back to normal work and consumption patterns. However, 
the policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve sent a promising signal to the S&P 500 
when cases were the primary benchmark used by investors in assessing risk. 
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Consequently, the United States financial system was more sensitive to the amount of 
COVID-19 cases infecting citizens. Given the relatively small death toll of the virus in 
mid-March, United States investors may have been more interested in how the level of 
cases would shut down non-essential businesses for the remainder of 2020.  
Across the Australian specifications flipping the virus terms, the percentage 
change in COVID-19 cases and the lagged change in market returns are the variables 
with the largest explanatory power (Table 8, Panel C-D). However, an additional 
specification was estimated in which the percentage change in COVID-19 deaths was 
excluded, but the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements remained the 
indicator variable. Within this specification, an interesting finding ensued – the Fed’s 
policy announcements rendered a modest 1.3% increase in the All Ordinaries market 
returns (Table 8, Panel E). The Reserve Bank of Australia’s policy announcements did 
not relieve Australian investors of their grim economic outlook, but the Federal Reserve’s 
announcements did on a very small scale.  
Furthermore, the second specification for the United Kingdom reveals the impact 
of the United States monetary policy announcements on the FTSE market returns. For 
example, every United States monetary policy announcement is associated with a 5.3% 
increase in the United Kingdom’s stock market (Table 9, Panel B). Thus, the economic 
outlook for the United Kingdom is responsive to the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented 
willingness to lend to foreign entities. This is consistent with the finding that 
announcements of the Federal Reserve’s interventions are met with improved trading 
conditions (Kargar et. al, 2020). However, this hypothesis was previously only limited to 
the corporate bond market. Therefore, these findings can be extended to improved trading 
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conditions in foreign markets in limited circumstances. A potential risk of this pattern is 
that United Kingdom investors may expect a sort of “safety net” for dollars that might 
lead to risky borrowing in times of economic progress (Ng and Timiraos, 2020). 
A final specification for all three countries is presented, in which the percentage 
change of COVID19 deaths is excluded instead of the percentage change of COVID19 
cases. The primary reason for this specification is to investigate market concerns over 
COVID19 cases absent deaths. In the United States, however, the announcement effect in 
this approach did not garner sufficient explanatory power. With every 10% increase in 
the Federal Reserve’s monetary base, the S&P 500 dropped by 40% (Table 7, Panel C). 
Given that the largest monetary expansion occurred just as the pandemic was leading to 
widespread shutdowns, it is again important to put this finding in perspective.  That is, 
how much bigger would the market drop have been absent the Fed’s intervention and 
would the market have recovered over the following months without it?  While the 
monetary base likely does not capture all factors relevant to the market, the expectation 
was still that monetary stimulus would be associated with a positive change in the market 
returns. In the third United Kingdom specification, a 10% increase in COVID-19 deaths 
was met by a 13.4% market drop when the change in COVID-19 cases was excluded 
(Table 9, Panel C). 
II. Sector Indices Analysis 
After completing regressions with the same specifications outlined above, but 
altering the dependent variable to the 11 sector indices, several interesting sectoral 
differences are found for the three countries are observed. In the United States, the sector 
with the greatest sensitivity to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements was 
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the energy sector, which shot up 10% for every announcement made (see Table 10, 
Column 1). When the Federal Reserve announced its Main Street Lending Program, it 
was originally intended to extend emergency support for small and medium businesses. 
However, the program faced massive scrutiny from a variety of parties for its exclusion 
of the energy sector. Although the oil and gas industry was already indebted before the 
pandemic, it advocated for a financial lifeline from the Federal Reserve. The oil and gas 
industry, Congressional allies, and the Trump administration pressured the central bank 
to expand the scope of the program to oil and gas companies.12 These changes 
represented significant benefits to the US energy sector. In addition, the financial sector 
responded positively to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements – an 8.5% 
spike in the financial sector resulted from every announcement (see Table 11, Column 2). 
This came as no surprise, as the Federal Reserve implemented several temporary 
emergency lending programs in an attempt to support financial stability. Therefore, it is 
trivial that such effects on the financial sector are validated. Next, the Materials sector 
index increased 7.8% with every monetary policy announcement made by the Federal 
Reserve (see Table 11, Column 6). As of September, the Materials sector has proved to 
be the best-performing of the sectors, and has even climbed 16% in the third quarter.13 
These gains can be largely attributed to the sector’s bet on an economic recovery, which 
the Federal Reserve’s policy announcements likely expedited. Similarly, the Industrials 
sector climbed 6.4% in response to the policy announcements (see Table 11, Column 3). 
                                                
12 Gelzinis, Gregg et. al (2020). “The Fed’s Oil and Gas Bailout is a Mistake.” Center for American 
Progress. July 31. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2020/07/31/488320/feds-oil-
gas-bailout-mistake/. 




The Consumer Discretionary sector index also saw a 6.4% spike in response to the policy 
announcements (see Table 10, Column 3). This result was interesting, because consumer 
discretionary is comprised of non-essential products, which is usually tied to economic 
growth cycles. Given the lack of disposable income during the pandemic and high 
exposure to businesses hindered from opening during COVID-19, casual empiricism 
suggests that the Consumer Discretionary index would be substantially more difficult to 
influence. It seems as if the internet retail industry made up for the losses experienced by 
other businesses within the sector. Because Amazon comprises 40% of the sector’s 
market cap, it is arguably carrying the weight of the consumer discretionary sector.14 
Finally, the Communication Services sector index saw a gain of 5% when the Federal 
Reserve made its monetary policy announcements (see Table 10, Column 2). Not 
surprisingly, COVID-19 has not substantially affected this sector, which includes 
everyday companies like Google, Netflix, Facebook, and Verizon. Upward pressure on 
the demand for the services offered by these companies implies that, regardless of 
Federal Reserve stimulus, they would be performing better in the COVID-19 crisis than 
most. 
The policy announcements may have vastly improved the United States financial 
market, but Australian equity sectors had a rather uneven response. Within Australia, a 
variety of sectors responded positively to the policy announcements made by both the 
Federal Reserve. For example, the materials sector experienced a 1.7% boost in the index 
when a United States announcement was made (see Table 13, Column 6). Along with this 
positive outlook for the materials sector, Australia’s industrials sector slightly grew at 
                                                
14 Kastner, David (2020). “Consumer Discretionary Sector Rating: Marketperform.” Charles Schwab. 
October 15. https://www.schwab.com/resource-center/insights/content/consumer-discretionary-sector. 
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1.5% when the Federal Reserve issued a policy announcement (see Table 13, Column 3). 
Although Australia faced a decline in demand for steel, the Federal Reserve stimulus had 
a slightly positive effect on consumer outlooks for the sector. Moreover, the financial 
sector responded positively to the Federal Reserve’s announcements, increasing at 2.4% 
for every announcement made (see Table 13, Column 2). Not all sectors responded 
positively to the United States’ policy moves, however. One Australian sector in 
particular, health care, faced a drop of 1.97% for every Federal Reserve announcement 
(see Table 12, Column 4). Thus, even with Australia’s seemingly comparative advantage 
of being an isolated country, the health care sector was tested immensely during COVID-
19. Routinely considered as among the best in the world with over 10% of its GDP spent 
on health, Australia’s health care system experienced significant worry that hospitals 
could be overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients.15 Therefore, it was unlikely that the 
Federal Reserve’s policy announcements would have any effect on these concerns.  
The Reserve Bank of Australia’s policy announcements had negative effects on 
two sector indices. The financial sector responded negatively to the announcements, 
decreasing at 3.7% for every announcement made (see Table 13, Column 2). The slashing 
of the cash rate to .1 percent likely did not alleviate investor concerns in the financial 
sector, which is why Australia pushed for temporary swap lines with the Federal Reserve. 
These results are consistent with a recent study which found that a cut in the cash rate 
increases volatility within the banking sector (Atwood and Karpavicius 2018). Finally, 
the Australian real estate sector was the most sensitive to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 
                                                
15 Hinton, Thomas (2020). “Opinion on the Performance of the Health System during COVID-19 Crisis in 




policy announcements. The real estate sector experienced a 6.1% decline in its index 
when Australia’s central bank policy moves were announced (see Table 13, Column 5). 
Likely, the property market declines in larger areas of investment like Melbourne were 
unaffected by the Reserve Bank of Australia’s actions, implying that this sector warrants 
a more targeted approach to sufficiently operate post-COVID. 
Almost every sector within the United Kingdom was positively affected by the 
Fed’s announcements, but dropped in response to the Bank of England’s stimulus 
announcements. To start, the energy sector increased 4.2% in response to the Federal 
Reserve’s policy moves, while it decreased 19.1% in response to the Bank of England’s 
policy moves (see Table 14, Column 1). Thus, both central banks had a mixed effect on 
the energy sector. Decreased industrial and commercial use of power in the United 
Kingdom suggests a fall in the demand for power, especially as the country pushes for 
further investment into renewable energy. In addition, the UK’s materials sector spiked 
4.9% when the Federal Reserve issued an announcement, but dropped 15% when the 
Bank of Englad did (see Table 15, Column 6). Because COVID-19 massively impacted 
the United Kingdom’s supply chain in this sector, the UK saw depressed order volumes 
for materials. In fact, the UK’s construction sector took a nosedive as a result of the 
pandemic.16 Interestingly, the consumer discretionary sector was the most sensitive to the 
Fed’s announcements, increasing 8.1% for every announcement made (see Table 14, 
Column 3). Unfortunately the Bank of England’s announcements were met with a 13.6% 
decline in the consumer discretionary index (see Table 14, Column 3). While the 
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financials sector experienced a 5% boost in confidence as a result of the Fed’s 
intervention, it decreased by 11.5% in response to the Bank of England’s (see Table 15, 
Column 2). Therefore, English investors were seemingly reliant upon the Federal 
Reserve’s willingness to lend to creditworthy institutions, but the United Kingdom’s own 
central bank lacked a similar response to global markets. Also, the UK real estate sector 
decreased 8.3% after the Bank of England’s announcements, but only increased 3.5% 
when the Fed made announcements about its expansive programs (see Table 15, Column 
5). Thus, the UK real estate market was somewhat sensitive to the announcements of both 
central banks. The Bank of England’s purchase of government bonds were intended to 
provide a viable safety net for the real estate sector, but the announcement of such actions 
were not met with equal enthusiasm. Finally, the UK’s communication services sector 
was adversely responsive to the Bank of England’s policy moves (-12.5%), all while 
being boosted by the Federal Reserve’s policy announcements (+4.76%). This suggests 
that the Federal Reserve’s stimulus had a much more immediate impacts across a variety 
of sectors, while the Bank of England’s moves were insufficient to improving outlooks. 
Although the Fed’s policy moves alleviated concerns in the majority of United 
Kingdom’s sectors, it failed to do so in the following four. The industrials sector in the 
United Kingdom fell 9.9% when the Bank of England announced policy actions (see 
Table 15, Column 3). Additionally, the consumer staples sector index dropped 8.1% in 
response to the Bank of England’s announcements (see Table 15, Column 1). This sector 
was the least sensitive to the stimulus announcements, due to the sheer demand of 
consumer staples in the United Kingdom as the pandemic lockdown ensued. Yet, the 
health care sector in the United Kingdom responded to the domestic policy 
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announcements with a 10.6% drop in the index (see Table 14, Column 4). Regardless of 
the central bank’s intervention, this sector would experience similar declines because of 
the uncertainty surrounding it. Not even George Soros himself could predict how full the 
hospitals would become when concerns of the pandemic persisted across financial 
markets. Lastly, the UK’s utilities sector saw an 11.8% drop in response to the Bank of 
England’s monetary policy announcements (see Table 15, Column 4). Due to the demand 
for power falling 15% from the same time last year, the UK’s utility sector did not find a 
lifeline in the BOE’s policy moves.17 
III. Bank Specific Analysis 
Regional banks are representative of the regional economies they serve, falling 
between larger “big banks” and local community banks. While bigger banks are 
classified as more general financial firms, regional banks function more like traditional 
banks. For instance, regional banks provide similar services to larger banks, but operate 
on a smaller scale – either within one state or amongst a group of states. Regional banks 
are also limited to the United States, as opposed to the Big Four Banks (Wells Fargo & 
Co., Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., and JPMorgan Chase & Co.), who operate at 
a global level. The large Wall Street banks play a massive role in trading and investment 
banking, taking on securitization and other complex finance functions. For regional 
banks, their primary source of funding is deposits. This trend has been highilghted in the 
years following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, in which regional banks saw a surge in 
domestic deposits from 69.5% in 2003 to 82.2% of total liabilities in 2014 as consumers 
                                                





rushed to safety.18 Despite this spike in the volume of deposits, regional banks were 
reluctant to take on loans of equal magnitude – a result of the weakened US economy and 
depressed demand for loans.19 As banks foresaw an increase in interest rates amidst a 
weakened economy, they were more attracted to deposits as opposed to converting them 
into loans. Consequently, the gap between deposits and loans remains substantial among 
regional banks. Potential explanations include attention to risk and regulatory presssures. 
To use their intermediate size to their advantage, regional banks have fundamentally 
realigned their businesses away from securitization and other complicated financial 
activities, leaving the larger banks to pick up the associated risk. This has allowed 
regional banks to swiftly respond to regulatory pressures, and to offer a host of financial 
products within niche commercial and industrial businesses.20 Despite these key 
differences, the Big Four Banks have exhibited a similar trend in the divergence of 
deposits and loans since 2008, suggesting an imminent threat for economic growth. 
I sought this additional look at regional banks because I was interested in how 
efficiently regional lenders were serving the specific locations in which they operate 
during the pandemic. Moreover, I expect regional bank reactions to the stimulus to be 
much stronger than the overall market indices. Limited in scale, regional banks lack the 
same capacity to sustain profits in economic downturns enjoyed by larger banks. The 
market may be wary of investing in regional banks, which are still particularly “tough” 
investments amidst government-mandated shutdowns at both the local and national 
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level.21 But if the recent abrupt fall – and subsequent rise – in the S&P 500 has taught 
investors anything, it is that these worries may be subverted by the Federal Reserve’s 
policy responses. 
Following the sectoral analysis, I estimate a specification where the dependent 
variable and lagged dependent variable reflect three regional bank indices extracted from 
Bloomberg. Table 16 presents the results of these indices. The first of these is the S&P 
500 Regional Banks Sub Industry GICS Level 4 Index (SP5RBNK), which is a 
capitalization weighted index of 13 regional banks in the United States. The largest 
member among this group is SVB Financial Corporation, which comprises approximately 
36% of the total index price. First of all, this index was most sensitive to the change in 
U.S. coronavirus cases when compared to the other two indices. For every 10% increase 
in COVID-19 cases, the SPS5RBNK index fell 3.1% (Column 1). Furthermore, the 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements elicited a 10.6% increase in the index 
for every announcement made (Column 1). In addition, the increase in the monetary base 
resulted in a steep drop in the SP5RBNK of -131.5%, suggesting that the money 
explosion did little to reassure banks of financial market conditions (Column 1). 
Therefore, the announcements effectively communicated the Fed’s support to the 
regional banks, while the expansion of the US monetary supply weakened the outlook for 
the regional banks. 
The next index observed is the S&P Regional Banks Select Industry Index 
(SPSIRBK), which comprises stocks of 126 banks in the S&P Total Market Index. I 
                                                
21 Levitt, Hannah (2020). “Regional Banks Take a Beating with Investors Expecting More Pain.” 




expect that this larger group of banks will be more strongly affected by the stimulus 
announcement because of how broadly the sub-industry is defined. For example, most of 
the banks within this index account for less than 1% of the total index price, with the 
largest being First Citizens BancShares Inc. at 10.91%. Every 10% increase in COVID-
19 cases caused a 2.97% drop in the index (Column 2). Contrary to my expectation, the 
change in monetary base impacted this index slightly less than the previous index, with a 
decline of 125.6% for every 10% increase in the United States monetary base (Column 
2). But, the monetary policy announcements had a stronger impact on this index, 
climbing 13% every time the Fed issued one (Column 2). Since the SPSIRBK index 
operates on a much more local level, the member composition most likely attributed to 
this heightened sensitivity. 
The final index analyzed is the KBW Regional Banking Index (KRX), which is a 
modified-capitalization-weighted index designed to represent the performance of the 
wide breadth of the U.S. regional banking industry. In this index, 50 banks are 
representative of the U.S. regional banking industry. Mostly community banks, the 
distribution for the KRX index is, for the most part, even across all 50 members. I found 
that the KRX index was the least sensitive to the change in the monetary base, decreasing 
only 105.3% for every 10% increase (Column 3). It was also the most unaffected by the 
onset of the pandemic, decreasing by 2.67% when cases increased by 10 basis points 
(Column 3). Surprisingly, the KRX index is barely more sensitive to the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy announcements, increasing by 13.2% when a program or 
facility is announced (Column 3). All in all, these results suggest that the United States 
regional banking industry responded positively to the policy announcements, negatively 
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to the increases in the monetary base, and marginally negative to the increases in 
COVID-19 cases. Therefore, the signals of the Federal Reserve stepping in to do 
whatever it can to offset the pandemic alleviated the unprecedented concerns that lending 
would come to a screeching halt. 
Furthermore, I analyzed three exchange traded funds (ETFs) to determine if the 
pandemic altered long-term perceptions of regional banks. The results for the regional 
bank ETFs are presented in Table 17. In particular, the SDPR S&P Regional Banking 
ETF (KRE) resembles the performance of the S&P Regional Banks Select Industry Index 
mentioned above. The KRE ETF includes holdings of 127 regional banks within the 
United States. Similar to the regional banking indices, the KRE dramatically decreased 
following the rise in the monetary base, falling at 120.9% for every 10% increase 
(Column 1). Thus, the monetary explosion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet was not 
nearly enough to offset the consumer uncertainty in the regional banking industry in the 
long-term. Along the same lines, a 10% increase in U.S. COVID-19 cases led to a 2.89% 
drop in the KRE ETF (Column 1). The regional banking ETFs were only barely affected 
by the change in COVID-19 cases because of the uptick in demand for regional banks to 
extend credit to businesses and households during the pandemic. The Federal Reserve’s 
signaling of monetary policy to stimulate consumer spending led to a 12.8% increase in 
the KRE ETF (Column 1). 
A second ETF was observed to assess the impact of federal reserve actions. The 
iShares U.S. Regional Banks (IAT) ETF looks to replicate investment results that 
correspond to the price and yield performance of the Dow Jones U.S. Select Regional 
Bank Index, with holder ownership totaling 57 regional banks. Results for the IAT ETF 
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show similar patterns to the KRE, yielding a -122% drop when a 10% increase in the 
monetary base ensued (Column 2). Market participants could be manifesting concerns of 
inflation as the Federal Reserve has extended its monetary policy beyond normal bounds 
to respond to the coronavirus, as observed by Burdekin (2020).22 Similar findings of 
minimal ETF drops in response to increasing COVID-19 cases were found in the IAT 
ETF (Column 2). Also, the IAT ETF rose by 11.4% in response to the monetary policy 
announcements (Column 2). 
The final ETF observed was the Invesco KBW Regional Banking ETF (KBWR). 
Composed of 52 holdings, this ETF monitors the KBW Nasdaq Regional Banking Index, 
which holds U.S.-listed banking and thrift companies participating in U.S. regional 
banking activities. Because the KBWR ETF has the smallest number of holdings, it is not 
surprising that it was less sensitive to the change in monetary base, falling -101.1% for 
every 10% increase (Column 3). Additionally, the KBWR ETF was the least responsive 
to the rise in COVID-19 cases, as exemplified by a -2.68% coefficient when cases rose 
10% (Column 3). However, the KBWR ETF responded similarly to the policy 
announcements, increasing by 12.5% every time an announcement was issued (Column 
3). 
 When comparing these results to the overall financial sector in the United States, 
a few key differences and similarities are noteworthy. The regional banks bore the brunt 
of the risk associated with the Federal Reserve’s expansion of its balance sheet. For 
instance, the overall US financial sector declined 104.1% for every 10% increase in the 
monetary base (see Table 11, Column 2). On the other hand, all three regional bank 
                                                
22 Burdekin, Richard C.K. (2020). “The U.S. Money Explosion of 2020, Monetarism and Inflation: Plagued 
by History?” forthcoming in Modern Economy. 
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indices declined by levels larger than those assessed for the broader financial sector (see 
Table 16, Columns 1-3). Therefore, bearish investor perceptions on U.S. regional bank 
stocks persisted due to the Fed increasing the money in circulation.  
The regional bank ETFs, in turn, also saw larger percentage drops in response to 
the monetary expansion than the overall financial sector, with the only exception being 
the KBWR – the ETF with the smallest amount of holdings – which fell slightly less at 
101.1% (see Table 17, Column 3). In addition, the increases in COVID-19 cases were 
met with decreased optimism in both the overall US financial sector and the regional 
banking sector. Still, the effects were more pronounced at the regional level, falling 
closer to 3% when compared to approximately 2.4% in the financial sector (see Table 11, 
Column 2; Table 16, Columns 1-3). In conclusion, the US financial sector was 
significantly less sensitive to the Fed’s monetary policy announcements when compared 
to the regional banking sector. Likely, regional banks were more willing to participate in 
the Federal Reserve’s novel credit programs like the MSLP, contrary to larger financial 
institutions. Ultimately, regional banks experienced a boost in their indices when 
additional credit became available to support lending to local entities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The coronavirus has impacted every major world economy, and each central bank 
response to the novel virus has varied to a significant degree. Some countries, like 
Australia and the UK, have relied upon more traditional monetary policy tools, like 
lowering the cash rate, to act as a form of monetary stimulus. Yet, the United States has 
stepped into the role of the global lender of last resort to keep markets afloat– taking on 
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debt when other countries were reluctant to do so. Doing so required the Federal Reserve 
to employ not only the vast amounts of monetary policy tools it utilized during the Global 
Financial Crisis, but also to push the boundaries of what is considered their normal 
monetary policy actions. Interestingly, the Federal Reserve has attempted to act as a 
transatlantic bridge between its own economy and foreign entities to signal that the 
United States will support the global economy. The Federal Reserve’s March 23rd 
announcement to purchase investment-grade bonds was associated with a 7% increase in 
investment-grade bond prices (Haddad et. al, 2020). In addition, the Federal Reserve’s 
April 9th announcement increased the price of both investment-grade and high-yield 
bonds (Haddad et. al, 2020). While the Federal Reserve has expanded its power by 
employing several tools beyond its normal bounds, the European currency union has been 
reluctant to instill a nationally focused policy that will resolve liquidity concerns (Grund, 
2020). Announcements of the Federal Reserve’s interventions to intevene in the global 
economy are met with improved trading conditions in the corporate bond market (Kargar 
et. al, 2020). The “unconventional” monetary policy announcements were also as 
associated with an 8.3% increase in the S&P 500 (Cox et. al, 2020), which was validated 
by the current study. 
I attempted to explain how the S&P 500 went from its second-largest one-day 
drop in history to rebound modestly into the third quarter of 2020, with an emphasis on 
the effects of the Federal Reserve’s novel monetary policy announcements on foreign 
markets of developed countries such as Australia and the UK. The policy announcements 
were intended to boost consumer confidence within the United States, but also assisted 
economic outlooks in other countries. In particular, I estimated an ordinary least squares 
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regression model assessing the effects of virus measures, monetary base, and monetary 
policy actions on the market returns for three select countries: the United States, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom. 
Overall, I found that the S&P 500 rose by 4.2% when the Federal Reserve issued 
a monetary policy announcement. One explanation was the US financial system’s 
reliance upon the Federal Reserve as the lender of last resort. The industries who were 
severely impacted by the virus (i.e. aerospace, restaurant and hospitality) most likely saw 
a grim economic outlook for years to come, but the central bank effectively alleviated 
those concerns with its expansive monetary policy. Rather than wait until the coronavirus 
posed a substantial threat to economic outlooks, the Federal Reserve actively took on the 
role of providing ample liquidity for both households and businesses alike. It was these 
very actions that solidified investor perceptions of the Federal Reserve as the benchmark 
for how a globally important financial institution should react to threats of a potential 
financial crisis. Evidence from earlier pandemics suggest that the inflationary threat of 
the 2020 monetary expansion is imminent.23 As argued by Burdekin, 2020, market 
participants manifested worries that expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is a 
harbinger of potential inflation. Whether pent-up spending will result in inflation is 
contingent upon the Federal Reserve’s ability to raise interest rates following the 
economic fallout of the coronavirus. Yet, the substantial expansion in the Fed’s balance 
sheet may conflict with this goal. As is the case with other central banks, when the crisis 
subsides, the US government will ultimately pressure the Fed’s decision to rescind the 
                                                
23 Burdekin, Richard C.K. (2020). “The U.S. Money Explosion of 2020, Monetarism and Inflation: Plagued 
by History?” forthcoming in Modern Economy. 
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monetary stimulus it has injected into the financial system – putting strains on the central 
bank’s operational independence.24 
Similarly, the FTSE increased by 5.3% when the Federal Reserve made its 
monetary policy announcements. Thus, the Federal Reserve’s novel liquidity facilities 
improved  UK investors’ willingness to shore up market risk during the financial strains 
resulting from the pandemic. This finding is particularly interesting because of how 
different the United States and the United Kingdom are in their approaches to liquidity in 
resolution. Consequently, UK investors may expect a sort of “safety net” for US dollars 
that could lead to moral hazard when the economy is growing as it was in 2019 (Ng and 
Timiraos, 2020). Australia responded to the stimulus announcements on a much smaller 
scale. For every Federal Reserve announcement issued, the All Ordinaries Index rose by 
1.3%, suggesting that merely central bank announcements alone modestly improved 
market conditions in Australia. 
Narrowing the regression estimates to the sectoral level rendered several 
interesting results. For example, in the United States, the energy sector responded most 
positively to the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements, largely due to the 
recent inclusion of companies in the sector into the Main Street Lending Program. Other 
U.S. sectors responding optimistically to the monetary policy announcements included 
financials, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and communication services. 
Overseas, the story varies substantially. In Australia, some sectors responded positively 
to the Federal Reserve policy announcements. Namely, the materials, industrials, and 
                                                
24 Shanine, Alaa (2020). “BOE’s Haldane Says QE Size Challenges Central Bank 





financials sectors all increased slightly in response to the U.S. announcements. However, 
the Australian health care sector responded negatively to these same announcements, 
implying that concerns of Australia’s hospitals being overwhelmed trumped any 
intervention of the Fed. Yet, Australia’s announcements were met with drops in the 
financials and real estate sectors, suggesting that slashing the cash rate led to volatility in 
the banking sector (Atwood and Karpavicius 2018). Finally, the United Kingdom sectors 
had the most profound responses to the policy announcements both overseas and 
domestically. For example, the Federal Reserve’s policy announcements improved sector 
outlooks for the UK energy, materials, consumer discretionary, communication services, 
financials, and real estate sectors. However, the Bank of England’s policy announcements 
were only met with negative reactions in the sectors previously mentioned, as well as the 
health care, utilities, and consumer staples sectors. Therefore, the United Kingdom 
heavily relied upon the Federal Reserve’s announcement effect to improve sector 
outlooks among English investors.  
At the bank-specific level, a consistent pattern was identified. Among the United 
States regional banking indices, all three indices displayed similar reactions to changes in 
monetary base, changes in COVID-19 cases, and the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy 
announcements to varying degrees. All indices has enormously negative responses to the 
increases in the monetary base, suggestive of inflationary concerns as the Federal 
Reserve blurred the line between its traditional monetary policy and fiscal policy during 
the 2020 crisis. Moreover, upticks in COVID-19 cases elicited slightly negative 
responses from the regional banks in the United States banking system. However, the 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy announcements calmed market concerns at the 
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regional banking level, instilling a signal of improved market conditions. Similar results 
were found when among the regional bank ETFs. All three ETFs responded rather 
pessimistically to the Fed’s money explosion, and, on a much smaller scale, responded 
negatively to U.S. increases in COVID-19 cases. Finally, ETFs improved comparable to 
the regional bank indices when the Federal Reserve issued monetary policy 
announcements. Inflationary concerns were the impetus of the fall in both the indices and 
ETFs, but the Fed’s signal of extending credit to the banking system alleviated such 
concerns.  
The most glaring shortcoming of the present study was a lack of a sufficient 
observations for the United States and the United Kingdom. Because both central banks 
discontinued their weekly monetary base data, I only had a limited number of 
observations from which to derive significant effects on the overall stock market. More 
high-frequency event data is necessary for future studies to determine the longer-term 
affects of these policies. Furthermore, the selected variables likely did not capture every 
factor affecting the market drops in each country. For example, the unemployment rate 
spiked substantially in all three countries as governments responded to the coronavirus 
pandemic. In turn, the labor market suffered, which was likely a massive driving factor 
behind market falls in mid-March. Additional research warrants a steady look at labor 
market figures in the midst of these historic drops in the S&P 500, the FTSE, and the All 
Ordinaries. 
 Due to the United Kingdom’s reliance on the Federal Reserve to ease market 
conditions, one concern could be the potential infringement on the central bank’s 
independence in similar financial crises. The impact of the Federal Reserve policy proved 
 
 45 
essential in avoiding disaster, but this may come at a price. In fact, the sheer size of 
quantitative easing alone has pointed to concerns over the independence of central banks 
during the current crisis.25 While the BOE has protections in place to prevent fiscal 
dominance from such avenues, there is no guarantee that the Federal Reserve will 
maintain its prescribed distance from the US political system. Currently, tensions are 
running high between Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who is attempting to let the 
emergency lending programs expire, and the Fed, which is seeking to maintain their 
functioning.26 The Federal Reserve has proven to be the saving grace for bearish foreign 
entities. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve’s liberal lending policies may become the 
benchmark for global monetary stimulus when other countries are unable to assess risk, 
as was the case in the second quarter of 2020. For example, with Brexit currently 
underway in the European Union, any financial collapse of debt-ridden countries in the 
Euro area, like Greece, will undoubtedly rely upon the Federal Reserve for monetary 
stimulus. Instead of eagerly waiting for the Federal Reserve to once again signal its 
willingness to take on additional debt from foreign entities, the European Union should 
enact monetary policy that will adequately support its most troubled economies and 
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Figure 1: United States Weekly Monetary Base vs. Weekly S&P 500 Returns, 






























































































































































































































Figure 2: Australia Daily Open Market Operations vs. Daily All Ordinaries 

































































































































































































Figure 3: United Kingdom Weekly Monetary Base vs. Weekly FTSE Returns, 
























































































































































































































Figure 4. United States Percentage Changes in Coronavirus Cases and Deaths, 






























































































































































































Figure 5. Australia Percentage Changes in Coronavirus Cases and Deaths, 











































































































































































































Figure 6. United Kingdom Percentage Changes in Coronavirus Cases and Deaths, 






















































































































































































Table 1A: Summary Statistics - United States 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Change in S&P 500        39 -0.0015402 0.0535236 -0.1285991 0.1575222 
Change in Monetary Base 39 0.0095571 0.0357555 -0.0432106 0.1651095 
Change in Cases 39 0.9249289 1.902145 0 7.59359 
Change in Deaths 39 0.536382 1.315658 0 6.416667 
Policy Announcement 39 0.1282051 0.3386884 0 1 
 
Table 1B: Correlation Matrix – United States 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) S&P 500 Returns 1.000     
      
(2) Monetary Base -0.117 1.000    
 (0.477)     
 
(3) COVID-19 Cases 0.481 0.613 1.000   
 (0.002) (0.000)    
 
(4) COVID-19 Deaths 0.406 0.762 0.959 1.000  
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)   
 
(5) US Policy Announcement -0.678 0.052 -0.259 -0.285 1.000 


















Table 1C: Correlation Matrix – United States (Differenced Growth Rates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Change in S&P 500 Returns 1.000     
      
(2) Change in Monetary Base -0.364 1.000    
 (0.025)    
 
 
(3) Change in COVID-19 Cases -0.232 -0.372 1.000   
 (0.161) (0.021)   
 
 
(4) Change in COVID-19 Deaths 0.142 -0.282 0.635 1.000  
 (0.397) (0.087) (0.000)   
 
(5) US Policy Announcement -0.106 0.632 -0.044 0.113 1.000 





























Table 2A: Summary Statistics – Australia 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Change in All Ordinaries 170 -0.0000016 0.0339373 -0.1361684 0.1495507 
Change in Open Market Operations 170 0.2998469 1.230219 -1 7.753149 
Change in Cases 170 0.0606527 0.1540268 0 1.410437 
Change in Deaths 170 0.0433475 0.1173141 0 1 
Domestic Policy Announcement 170 0.0117647 0.1081438 0 1 
US Policy Announcement 170 0.0294118 0.1694569 0 1 
 
Table 2B: Correlation Matrix – Australia 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) All Ordinaries Returns 1.000      
       
(2) Open Market Operations -0.192 1.000     
 (0.012)   
 
   
(3) COVID-19 Cases -0.183 -0.428 1.000    
 (0.017) (0.000)  
 
   
(4) COVID-19 Deaths -0.078 -0.367 0.952 1.000   
 (0.311) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
  
(5) Domestic Policy 
Announcement 
-0.076 0.313 -0.102 -0.080 1.000  
 (0.325) (0.000) (0.187) (0.298)  
 
 
(6) US Policy Announcement -0.227 0.160 -0.068 -0.084 -0.019 1.000 












Table 2C: Correlation Matrix – Australia (Differenced Growth Rates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) First Difference in All Ordinaries Returns 1.000      
       
(2) Change in Open Market Operations 0.103 1.000     
 (0.182)      
 
(3) Change in COVID-19 Cases -0.362 -0.018 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.815)     
 
(4) Change in COVID-19 Deaths -0.180 0.044 0.368 1.000   
 (0.020) (0.573) (0.000)    
 
(5) Domestic Policy Announcement 0.021 -0.030 -0.044 0.097 1.000  
 (0.789) (0.698) (0.573) (0.210)   
 
(6) US Policy Announcement -0.004 -0.079 0.028 -0.094 -0.158 1.000 

























Table 3A: Summary Statistics - United Kingdom 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Change in FTSE 100 37 -0.0005904 0.0633317 -0.1606693 0.2550407 
Change in Monetary Base 37 0.001672 0.006661 -0.0248476 0.0124173 
Change in Cases 37 0.7098114 1.635045 0 7.384615 
Change in Deaths 37 0.6457987 2.017968 0 10.71429 
Domestic Policy Announcement 37 0.027027 0.164399 0 1 
US Policy Announcement 37 0.1351351 0.3465835 0 1 
 
Table 3B: Correlation Matrix – United Kingdom 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) FTSE Returns 1.000      
       
(2) Monetary Base -0.195 1.000     
 (0.247)   
 
   
(3) COVID-19 Cases -0.491 0.840 1.000    
 (0.002) (0.000)   
 
  
(4) COVID-19 Deaths -0.488 0.811 0.997 1.000   
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)   
 
 
(5) Domestic Policy Announcement -0.133 -0.180 -0.177 -0.177 1.000  
 (0.434) (0.286) (0.296) (0.294)   
 
(6) US Policy Announcement -0.469 -0.329 -0.235 -0.239 -0.066 1.000 












Table 3C: Correlation Matrix – United Kingdom (Differenced Growth Rates) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) First Difference in FTSE Returns 1.000      
       
(2) Change in Monetary Base 0.308 1.000     
 (0.068)    
 
  
(3) Change in COVID-19 Cases -0.017 -0.123 1.000    
 (0.924) (0.475)    
 
 
(4) Change in COVID-19 Deaths -0.264 -0.060 0.185 1.000   
 (0.120) (0.728) (0.280)   
 
 
(5) Domestic Policy Announcement -0.202 -0.054 -0.248 -0.616 1.000  
 (0.238) (0.752) (0.145) (0.000)   
 
(6) US Policy Announcement -0.052 0.019 0.030 0.383 -0.289 1.000 


























Table 4: Unit Root Test Statistics - United States 
Percentage Changes Observations Test Statistic p-value 
S&P 500 Returns 38 -9.317 0.000 
Monetary Base 38 -21.672 0.000 
Increase in Cases 38 -8.682 0.000 




Table 5: Unit Root Test Statistics - Australia 
Percentage Changes Observations Test Statistic p-value 
All Ordinaries Returns 168 -29.015 0.000 
Open Market Operations 168 -22.300 0.000 
Increase in Cases 168 -24.096 0.000 




Table 6: Unit Root Test Statistics - United Kingdom 
Percentage Changes Observations Test Statistic p-value 
FTSE Returns 36 -10.508 0.000 
Monetary Base 36 -5.526 0.000 
Increase in Cases 36 -7.680 0.000 










Table 7: United States Estimation Results from December 2019 - September 2020 
 
A. United States - All Variables 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.228 0.120 -1.34 0.189 
Change in Monetary Base -0.609 0.005 -2.44 0.020 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.021 0.001 -2.54 0.016 
Change in Increase in Deaths 0.019 0.086 1.09 0.284 
Change in Monetary Policy Announcement 0.031 0.213 1.05 0.301 
Constant -0.002 0.813 -0.24 0.813 
Overall R-Squared = .48; 38 Observations     
 
 
B. United States - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Cases 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.280 0.144 -1.95 0.060 
Change in Monetary Base -0.672 0.205 -3.29 0.002 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.015 0.005 -3.10 0.004 
Change in Monetary Policy Announcement 0.042 0.024 1.77 0.087 
Constant -0.002 0.007 -0.23 0.823 











C. United States - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Deaths 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.356 0.162 -2.21 0.034 
Change in Monetary Base -0.408 0.227 -1.80 0.081 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.004 0.010 -0.34 0.737 
Change in Monetary Policy Announcement 0.025 0.028 0.88 0.385 
Constant -0.002 0.008 -0.20 0.846 




























Table 8: Australia Estimation Results from December 2019 - September 2020 
 
A. Australia - All Variables with Domestic Policy Announcement as the Indicator 
Variable 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.622 0.059 -10.55 0.000 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.001 0.001 1.09 0.278 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.034 0.012 -2.86 0.005 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.007 0.013 -0.54 0.588 
Change in Domestic Policy Announcement -0.016 0.013 -1.31 0.192 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.04 0.968 





B. Australia - All Variables with US Policy Announcement as the Indicator Variable 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.623 0.059 -10.62 0.000 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.001 0.001 1.26 0.210 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.033 0.012 -2.86 0.005 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.007 0.013 -0.53 0.595 
Change in US Policy Announcement 0.013 0.008 1.61 0.109 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.04 0.968 





C. Australia - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Cases 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.633 0.059 -10.75 0.000 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.001 0.001 1.18 0.240 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.036 0.011 -3.27 0.001 
Change in Domestic Policy Announcement -0.015 0.013 -1.17 0.244 
Change in US Policy Announcement 0.012 0.008 1.50 0.135 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.04 0.969 
Overall R-Squared = .49; 169 Observations     
 
 
D. Australia - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Deaths 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.673 0.059 -11.46 0.000 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.001 0.001 1.23 0.221 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.019 0.012 -1.50 0.137 
Change in Domestic Policy Announcement -0.013 0.013 -0.96 0.336 
Change in US Policy Announcement 0.011 0.008 1.36 0.177 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.04 0.968 









E. Australia - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Cases and U.S. Policy 
Announcement as Indicator Variable 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.625 0.059 -10.68 0.000 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.001 0.001 1.24 0.218 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.036 0.011 -3.26 0.001 
Change in US Policy Announcement 0.013 0.008 1.69 0.094 
Constant 0.000 0.002 0.04 0.969 



























Table 9: United Kingdom Estimation Results from December 2019 - September 
2020 
 
A. United Kingdom - All Variables with Domestic Policy Announcement as the 
Indicator Variable 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.602 0.113 -5.32 0.000 
Change in Monetary Base 1.46 1.140 1.28 0.212 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.004 0.005 -0.82 0.421 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.022 0.004 -5.27 0.000 
Change in Domestic Policy Announcement -0.139 0.037 -3.77 0.001 
Constant -0.002 0.007 -0.27 0.791 
Overall R-Squared = .66; 38 Observations     
 
B. United Kingdom - All Variables with US Policy Announcement as the Indicator 
Variable 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.751 0.135 -5.55 0.000 
Change in Monetary Base 1.644 1.260 1.3 0.202 
Change in Increase in Cases -0.001 0.005 -0.16 0.875 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.018 0.004 -4.20 0.000 
Change in US Policy Announcement 0.053 0.021 2.48 0.019 
Constant -0.002 0.007 -0.26 0.799 






C. United Kingdom - Virus Term as Percentage Change in Deaths 
 
Change in Market Returns Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic P>|t| 
Lagged Change in Market Returns -0.590 0.112 -5.29 0.000 
Change in Monetary Base 1.602 1.122 1.43 0.163 
Change in Increase in Deaths -0.022 0.004 -5.30 0.000 
Change in Domestic Policy Announcement -0.134 0.036 -3.70 0.001 
Constant -0.002 0.067 -0.26 0.795 





























Table 10: United States Sector Indices Estimation Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Health Care Information 
Technology 
      
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.250* -0.0924 -0.156 -0.0540 -0.312** 
 (0.131) 
 
(0.148) (0.150) (0.145) (0.152) 
Change in Monetary Base -1.718*** -0.555*** -0.966*** -0.145 -0.614** 
 (0.462) 
 
(0.181) (0.276) (0.140) (0.244) 
Change in Cases -0.0414*** -0.0204*** -0.0207*** -0.0202*** -0.0193*** 
 (0.0119) 
 
(0.00520) (0.00667) (0.00430) (0.00677) 
Change in Deaths 0.0628** 0.0136 0.0304** 0.0128 0.0194 
 (0.0231) 
 
(0.00976) (0.0128) (0.00830) (0.0127) 
Policy Announcements 0.102* 0.0466** 0.0638** 1.33e-05 0.0366 
 (0.0520) 
 
(0.0223) (0.0300) (0.0174) (0.0287) 
Constant -0.00208 -0.00143 -0.00138 -0.000816 -0.00240 
 (0.0146) (0.00610) (0.00805) (0.00493) (0.00796) 
      
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.606 0.445 0.560 0.481 0.458 
      
Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 11: United States Sector Indices Estimation Results (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Consumer 
Staples 
Financials Industrials Utilities Real Estate Materials 
       
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.0772 -0.257* -0.247 -0.0920 -0.00599 -0.123 
 (0.143) (0.138) (0.150) (0.136) (0.139) (0.0839) 
 
Change in Monetary Base 0.0967 -1.041*** -0.829*** -0.269 -0.626** -1.017*** 
 (0.127) (0.297) (0.303) (0.192) (0.273) (0.276) 
 
Change in Cases -0.0164*** -0.0237*** -0.0197** -0.0167*** -0.0174** -0.0246*** 
 (0.00341) (0.00799) (0.00807) (0.00562) (0.00768) (0.00780) 
 
Change in Deaths -0.00105 0.0232 0.0248 -0.00131 0.0140 0.0211 
 (0.00651) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0110) (0.0153) (0.0151) 
 
Policy Announcements 0.00106 0.0851** 0.0638* 0.0134 0.0256 0.0783** 
 (0.0139) (0.0347) (0.0354) (0.0236) (0.0333) (0.0338) 
 
Constant -0.000191 -0.000678 -0.000282 0.000314 0.000160 -0.00199 
 (0.00395) (0.00974) (0.00986) (0.00671) (0.00945) (0.00963) 
       
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.665 0.503 0.425 0.329 0.236 0.451 
Standard errors in parentheses 














Table 12: Australia Sector Indices Estimation Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Health Care Information 
Technology 
      
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.514*** -0.543*** -0.608*** -0.754*** -0.676*** 
 (0.0651) (0.0592) (0.0608) (0.0505) (0.0582) 
 
Change in Open Market Operations 0.00257 0.00197** 0.000407 -0.000406 0.000599 
 (0.00164) (0.000806) (0.00119) (0.00122) (0.000928) 
 
Change in Cases -0.0524*** -0.0432*** -0.0416*** -0.0221* -0.0173* 
 (0.0187) (0.00882) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0102) 
 
Change in Deaths -0.0304 0.00603 0.00605 0.00142 0.0105 
 (0.0204) (0.0100) (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0116) 
 
Domestic Policy Announcement -0.0270 0.0114 -0.00559 0.0137 0.00451 
 (0.0196) (0.00970) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0115) 
 
US Policy Announcement 0.00779 0.00600 0.00578 -0.0197** -0.00341 
 (0.0125) (0.00618) (0.00902) (0.00925) (0.00707) 
 
Constant 0.000213 0.000192 1.24e-05 -5.47e-06 0.000112 
 (0.00296) (0.00146) (0.00214) (0.00220) (0.00168) 
      
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 
R-squared 0.434 0.461 0.459 0.609 0.488 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 13: Australia Sector Indices Estimation Results (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Consumer 
Staples 
Financials Industrials Utilities Real Estate Materials 
       
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.688*** -0.558*** -0.565*** -0.569*** -0.483*** -0.599*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0643) (0.0616) (0.0633) (0.0676) (0.0615) 
 












       
Change in Cases -0.0249** -0.0479*** -0.0360*** -0.0535*** -0.0562*** -0.0273** 
 (0.00962) (0.0164) (0.0122) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0125) 
 
Change in Deaths 0.00389 -0.00755 -0.00992 -0.00589 0.0100 -0.0207 
 (0.0110) (0.0178) (0.0135) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0143) 
 
Domestic Policy Announcement 0.00624 -0.0367** -0.00189 -0.00343 -0.0609*** -0.00376 
 (0.0106) (0.0173) (0.0131) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0138) 
 
US Policy Announcement 0.00271 0.0243** 0.0154* -0.000562 0.0172 0.0174** 
 (0.00672) (0.0110) (0.00826) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.00876) 
 
Constant 6.21e-05 5.93e-05 0.000205 0.000185 0.000271 1.27e-05 
 (0.00160) (0.00259) (0.00197) (0.00246) (0.00247) (0.00207) 
       
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 169 
R-squared 0.513 0.436 0.454 0.453 0.459 0.442 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 14: United Kingdom Sector Indices Estimation Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




Health Care Information 
Technology 
      
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.691*** -0.721*** -0.666*** -0.544*** -0.553*** 
 (0.108) (0.118) (0.0933) (0.120) (0.111) 
 
Change in Monetary Base 1.971 1.441 2.212 1.159 3.766* 
 (1.326) (1.168) (1.880) (0.928) (2.103) 
 
Change in Cases -0.00450 -0.00859 -0.00478 -0.00221 -0.00724 
 (0.00570) (0.00514) (0.00799) (0.00401) (0.00909) 
 
Change in Deaths -0.0368*** -0.0234*** -0.0470*** -0.0193*** -0.0307*** 
 (0.00534) (0.00465) (0.00709) (0.00361) (0.00797) 
 
Domestic Policy Announcement -0.191*** -0.125*** -0.136** -0.106*** -0.0312 
 (0.0430) (0.0382) (0.0605) (0.0303) (0.0681) 
 
US Policy Announcement 0.0424* 0.0476** 0.0809** 0.00898 0.0160 
 (0.0226) (0.0197) (0.0302) (0.0146) (0.0339) 
 
Constant -0.00192 -0.00196 -0.00135 -0.00121 -0.000395 
 (0.00775) (0.00691) (0.0109) (0.00545) (0.0123) 
      
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.755 0.672 0.781 0.642 0.694 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 15: United Kingdom Sector Indices Estimation Results (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Consumer 
Staples 
Financials Industrials Utilities Real Estate Materials 
       
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.632*** -0.692*** -0.735*** -0.597*** -0.544*** -0.570*** 
 (0.137) (0.0931) (0.134) (0.150) (0.0951) (0.138) 
 
Change in Monetary Base 0.131 1.620 1.498 0.789 1.977 1.631 
 (0.791) (1.220) (1.045) (1.166) (1.227) (1.642) 
 
Change in Cases -0.00106 -0.00683 -0.000552 0.000190 -0.00593 0.00155 
 (0.00354) (0.00518) (0.00454) (0.00499) (0.00519) (0.00708) 
 
Change in Deaths -0.0146*** -0.0318*** -0.0202*** -0.00430 -0.0303*** -0.0299*** 
 (0.00313) (0.00462) (0.00431) (0.00465) (0.00458) (0.00652) 
 
Domestic Policy Announcement -0.0814*** -0.115*** -0.0993*** -0.118*** -0.0833** -0.151*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0390) (0.0344) (0.0365) (0.0391) (0.0537) 
 
US Policy Announcement 0.0174 0.0501** 0.0297 0.00172 0.0353* 0.0490* 
 (0.0125) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0273) 
 
Constant -0.00114 -0.00184 -0.00121 -0.00377 -0.000143 -0.00204 
 (0.00468) (0.00704) (0.00619) (0.00660) (0.00706) (0.00964) 
       
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.603 0.793 0.646 0.625 0.770 0.565 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 16: United States Regional Banks Index Estimation Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES S5RBNK SPSRBNK KRX 
    



































Constant -0.00137 -0.00169 -0.00202 
 (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0150) 
    
Observations 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.474 0.405 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses 















Table 17: United States Regional Banks ETF Estimation Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES KRE IAT KBWR 
    



































Constant -0.00168 -0.00123 -0.00198 
 (0.0150) (0.0139) (0.0152) 
    
Observations 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.395 0.415 0.357 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















A.1: Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Announcement Dummies 
 
Date Day Week  Event Description27 
March 
3/15/20 Sunday 3/18/20 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cuts federal funds rate target range to 0-.25% 
 
3/17/20 Tuesday 3/18/20 Establishment of Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
 
3/17/20 Tuesday 3/18/20 Establishment of Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) 
 
3/18/20 Wednesday 3/18/20 Establishment of Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) 
 
3/19/20 Thursday 3/25/20 Temporary US Dollar Liquidity Arrangements with Other Central Banks 
(Reserve Bank of Australia, Banco Central do Brasil, Bank of Korea, Banco de Mexico, 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Sveriges Riksbank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Norges 
Bank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand) 
 
3/20/20 Friday 3/25/20 Expansion of US Dollar Liquidity Arrangements with Other Central Banks 
(Bank of Canada, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank, Swiss National 
Bank) 
 
3/23/20 Monday 3/25/20 FOMC will sustain purchases of Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) 
 
3/23/20 Monday 3/25/20 Establishment of Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) 
Establishment of Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) 
Establishment of Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
Expansion of Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) 
Expansion of Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
 
3/31/20 Monday 4/1/20 Establishment of Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) Repo Facility 
April 
4/9/20 Thursday 4/15/20 Strengthening of SBA’s Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) 
Establishment of Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) 
Expansion of PMCCF, SMCCF, and TALF 
 
4/23/20 Thursday 4/29/20 Expansion of PPPLF 
 
4/27/20 Monday 4/29/20 Expansion of Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) 
 
4/29/20 Wednesday 4/29/20 FOMC will prolong its purchases of Treasuries and agency residential and commercial MBS 
  
                                                
27 Event Descriptions were reproduced from the study conducted by Cox, Josue, Daniel L. Greenwald, and 
Sydney C. Ludvigson (2020). “What Explains the COVID-19 Stock Market?” Working Paper, National 




A.2: Reserve Bank of Australia Monetary Policy Announcements 
 
Date Day Event Description 
March 
3/3/20 Tuesday Reserve Bank Board slashes cash rate by 25 basis points to .50%28 
 
3/19/20 Thursday Reserve Bank Board lowers cash rate by 25 basis points to .25% 
Establishment of a target yield on 3-year Australian Government bonds of approximately .25 per cent 
Establishment of a three-year term funding facility to support small and medium-sized businesses 





A.3: Bank of England Monetary Policy Announcements 
 




3/11/20 Wednesday 3/11/20 Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) unanimously agrees to lower Bank Rate by 50 basis 
points to .25% 
Establishment of Term Funding Scheme with incentives for small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
MPC unanimously proposes to uphold the stock of sterling non-financial investment-grade 
corporate bond purchases at 10 billion pounds sterling 
MPC unanimously elects to buttress the stock of UK government bond purchases at 435 
billion pounds sterling30 
  
 
                                                
28 Reserve Bank Board (2020, March 3). Statement by Philip Lowe Governor: Monetary Policy Decision. 
[Media Release] https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2020/mr-20-06.html. 
29 Reserve Bank Board (2020, March 19). Statement by Philip Lowe Governor: Monetary Policy Decision. 
[Media Release] https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2020/mr-20-08.html. 
30 Bank of England (2020, March 11). Bank of England measures to respond to the economic shock from 
Covid-19. [News Release] https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/boe-measures-to-respond-
to-the-economic-shock-from-covid-19. 
